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The Standard of Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agencies in the U.S. and EU: 
Accountability and Reasonable Agency Action 
INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the United States ("U.S.") and the treaties of 
the European Union ("EU") define the contours of government ac-
tion. I Neither institution, however, specifies who or what is govern-
ment.2 Behind the elected actors immediately perceived as defining 
"government" lies another realm of state power, the realm of the 
administrative agency.3 Holding administrative agencies accountable 
for their actions is a pressing issue in democratic governments.4 Judi-
cial review of administrative action is one method of regulating bureau-
cratic decision-making power.5 By reviewing the adequacy of the rea-
sons given by administrators for their actions, the court protects 
individual rights from unreasonable state action. 6 
The requirement that administrative agencies, as actors of the state, 
give reasons for their actions is a cornerstone of democracy.7 The 
1 See generaUy U.S. CONST. art. I-III; Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty"), Art. G, 
31 I.L.M. 247 (Feb. 7, 1992) (inserting a new Article 8 in the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community). 
2 See generaUy U.S. CONST. art. I-III; Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty"), Art. G, 
311.L.M. 247 (Feb. 7, 1992). 
3 SeeJURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 3-10 (1992); PETER L. STRAUSS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 51-100 (1989). 
4 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 51-100; see also Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Puwers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 575-76 (1984);]. Weiler, 
Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Q}lestions Concerning the Rnle of the European Court of Justice in the 
Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 
WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1103-09 (1986). 
5 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 51-100; Strauss, supra note 4, at 576 n.11; Weiler, supra note 4, 
at 1103-09. 
6 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 51-100; Weiler, supra note 4, at 1103-09; see also Martin Shapiro, 
The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 181 (1992); Richard]. Pierce,Jr., A 
Symposium on Administrative Law: "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agen-
cies, " April 4, 1986: Part I: Delegation of Puwers to Administrative Agencies: Commentary: Political 
Accountability and Delegated Puwer: A Response to Professor Lowi, 46 AM. U.L. REv. 391, 393 (1987). 
7 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 23-37. See also LOUIS FAVOREAU, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN 
EUROPE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
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judiciary assumes the power to regulate government actors by defining 
the adequacy of reasons given by administrators when implementing 
legislative directives.8 The lens through which the court reviews admin-
istrative conduct, Le., the standard of review applied to appeals from 
agency action, helps define the adequacy of the reasons stated.9 Al-
though the nature and effect of judicial review depends on the nature 
of the action under review, in all instances one role of review is to 
protect private parties from unreasonable state action. lO 
In the U.S., the administrative process is codified in the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). II In addition to establishing 
the process for agency rulemaking and minimum procedural require-
ments for agency action, the APA states the scope and standard of 
judicial review of administrative action.12 Unlike the U.S., the EU does 
not have a comprehensive system of administrative law. I!! Although the 
EU treaties establish procedural requirements for rule making and 
administrative action, the treaties do not specify which standard of 
judicial review the court must apply when reviewing administrative 
action.14 The European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), and more recently, 
TION ABROAD 38-62 (Louis Henkin & Albert Rosenthal eds., 1990) (judicial review of legislative 
action under constitutional guise fundamental to U.S. system with growing influence abroad); 
Theodore J. Lowi, A Symposium on Administrative Law: "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the 
Administrative Agencies," April 4, 1986: Part 1: Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies: 
Principal Paper: Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. 
U.L. REv. 295, 296-97 ("Every delegation of discretion away from electorally responsible levels 
of government to professional career administrative agencies is a calculated risk .... "). 
8 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 187; Koen Lenaerts, Some Thaughts About the Interaction Between 
Judges and Politicians, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 93 (1992). 
9 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 187; Lenaerts, supra note 8, at 94-96. 
10 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 188-90; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 23--50. Judicial review of 
Congressional acts differs from that of administrative acts. See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 103-32. 
The court applies a constitutional law analysis when reviewing whether the legislature was author-
ized to enact certain laws. See id. Separation of powers, constitutional authority, and federalism 
feature prominently in judicial review of legislative action. See id. In contrast, judicial review of 
administrative action analyzes whether the agency acted legally, i.e., within the bounds of its 
enabling legislation. See id. Although constitutional issues arise, especially relating to matters of 
due process and equal protection, courts focus primarily on rules of statutory construction to 
determine whether the agency action is authorized by Congress through the legislation the agency 
is required to implement. See id. Compare, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964) (authority of Congress to enact affirmative action legislation based on Article I 
of U.S. Constitution) with Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 
U.S. 837 (1984) (standard of review for statutory construction). 
II See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596, 701-706 (1994). 
12 See id. § 706. 
13 See SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 864. 
14 See id. at 864-66. 
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the Court of First Instance ("CFI"), however, both serve a role similar 
to that of U.S. courts in regulating administrative decision making. I5 
The EU Courts both apply a substantive standard of review when 
analyzing the legality of agency action. I6 
This note demonstrates how the ECJ and the CFI rely on the innocu-
ous "giving reasons" requirement of Article 190 of the Treaty of the 
European Economic Community ("Article 190") as the legal basis for 
a fluid standard of judicial review actively evolving towards its U.S. 
codified counterpartP Part I of this note summarizes basic principles 
of transparency in government action. Part II illustrates the U.S. appli-
cation and rationalization of judicial review of administrative action 
using the APA standards. Part III examines how the ECJ and CFI use 
Article 190 in case law as a basis for substantive review of agency action. 
Part IV compares similarities in the language and the purpose of the 
U.S. and EU courts when reviewing agency action. This note concludes 
that the ECJ and the CFI developed the "giving reasons" requirement 
of Article 190 into a full-fledged substantive review of administrative 
action comparable to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard codified 
in U.S. law.IS 
I. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT ACTION: THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
The modern administrative state developed in response to the social 
changes brought about by post-Industrial Revolution economies. I9 Ex-
panded governmental powers and new structural arrangements reflect 
the globalization of national economies and the need for expertise in 
diverse, complex segments of the economy.20 Changes in state structure 
influence modern legislative bodies, such as Congress, to spend the 
majority of their time on activities other than the enactment of legis-
lation.21 
The legislative and executive branches have created administrative 
agencies with substantial delegated powers to execute legislative direc-
15 See id. at 93-96; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 5-18. 
16 See SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 93-96; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 5-18. 
17 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 220. 
18 See id.; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
19 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. at 19. 
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tives.22 Regulating in accordance with statutory mandate, while remain-
ing sensitive to the needs of the diverse industries subject to regulation, 
is an enterprise too complex and technical for legislative bodies to 
resolve on their own.2!l Regulation is therefore left to expert decision-
makers through the delegation of legislative powers, i.e., rulemaking 
authority to the administrative agencies.24 
The Supreme Court has held that an agency has the unquestioned 
authority to promulgate its own rules and to interpret the meaning of 
the enabling statute itself. 25 As a practical matter, delegation of rule-
making authority is desirable.26 Agencies in charge of regulating highly 
technical fields need the ability to adapt to new circumstances in the 
industries with which they deal,27 An administrative agency should not 
22 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 19; ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw IN A GLOBAL 
ERA, 15-16 (1992); Lowi, supra note 7, at 296-97; Pierce, supra note 6, at 393. Congress has also 
created a system of legislative committees. See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 15-19. The legislative 
committees serve essentially investigative functions, conducting detailed oversight hearings of 
executive branch functioning, and generally investigations of perceived social ills or scandals. See 
ill. The powers and duties of the legislative committees raise a host of constitutional issues 
touching on separation of, and delegation of, power. See ill. Debate is particularly acute in matters 
relating to the action and authority ofindependent counsel investigations. See ill. In fact, "[sluch 
investigations have prompted enormous growth in congressional staff attached to the committees. 
This growth, in turn, has fueled investigations: committee staffs, once assembled, have a continu-
ing need for satistying work and visibility in the political atmosphere of Washington." Id. at 19. 
Although legislative committee function is subject to judicial review, this topic is beyond the scope 
of this note. See id. at 15-19. 
23 See ill. at 9; AMAN, supra note 22, at 15-21. Separate committees and agencies were also 
established in response to a system of government that separates the legislative branch from the 
executive branch. See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 15-21. 
24 See ill. 
25 See Chevron U.sA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984). The need for government transparency in this context seems clear, although the standard 
applied by the court appears minimal. See id.; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 22. According to the 
Supreme Court, "The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created 
... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any 
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
26 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 21-22. That the Court so held should not be taken for granted. 
See id. at 22. 
Id. 
Courts in some national systems might react to this conceded legislative failure by 
disapproving the agency's action-saying, for example, that the agency's authority was 
not sufficiently clear to uphold its action. Or it might be expected that the Court would 
simply resolve the disputed question of statutory meaning, so that it could be known 
for the future whether the "bubble" approach was or was not to be used. 
27 See ill.; see also AMAN, supra note 22, at 7. 
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need to mobilize the legislature in order to change a rule or regulation 
every time it acts.28 
The delegation of legislative powers, however, has generated vast 
amounts of administrative regulations, rules and decisions under some-
times extremely vague enabling authority.l!9 The judiciary assumes a key 
role in monitoring the legality of administrative action through the 
standard it applies when reviewing agency action.!!O The courts' role in 
enforcing the legality of administrative action is a direct result of the 
manner in which a democracy holds its government accountable.!!l 
When a government actor is a legislative body, such as Congress, it 
is required to give reasons for its actions so that the voting public can 
exercise its choice not to elect a representative it feels does not ade-
quately represent its interests.!!2 If the government actor is an adminis-
trative official who is appointed rather than elected, however, the 
"giving reasons" requirement does not increase the public's control 
over the administrative official through its power to vote.!!!! Transpar-
ency of government action nevertheless requires a bureaucrat to state 
28 See AMAN, supra note 22, at 7. ''This is particularly true in the absence of any dramatic crisis 
to place an issue on the legislative agenda and muster the necessary political support to pass it. " 
Id. 
29 See id. 
30 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 239-41. 
51 See id. at 51-100; see alsoAMAN, supra note 22, at 27. It should be noted that judicial review 
is not the only type of control of administrative action. See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 191. Judicial 
review is: 
Id. 
merely the most formal and lawyerly of controls that may be brought to bear . . . . 
Judicial review usually occurs after the fact, and in any event is limited to assessing the 
legality of particular actions rather than the appropriateness, direction, or distribution 
of policy effort. Thus, it will often be far from the consciousness of important agency 
officials as they shape their agency's business. 
Political intervention and oversight, ·open government" regulations such as the Freedom of 
Information Act, and in-record proceedings are just some of the available nonjudicial controls 
of administrative action. See id. at 192-204. 
52 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 180-84; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 191-92; see also Chevron 
U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 u.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
When a challenge to an agency [decision], fairly conceptualized, really centers on the 
wisdom of the policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left 
open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no 
constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. 
Cheuron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 u.S. at 866. 
55 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 180-84; Anne-Marie Burley, Democracy and Judicial Review in 
the European Community, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 81, 81-83 (1992). 
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reasons for his or her actions, albeit as a different basis of account-
ability.34 
The public holds an administrative agency accountable for its actions 
through the exercise of legal rights, i.e., by resort to judicial review of 
the agency action.35 In order to meet minimal requirements of account-
ability, therefore, an agency must "give reasons" sufficient to allow an 
individual to determine whether his rights have been violated.36 Of 
greater importance, the agency's reasons must be sufficiently detailed 
to allow a judge to perform meaningful judicial review.37 
Meaningful judicial review involves a substantive analysis of the 
agency's action.lIS The court does not merely ask, "Did the agency 
provide reasons?" The court queries, "Can good reasons be given for 
this statute or regulation? Are the reasons adequate? Are the reasons 
legal?"39 The "giving reasons" requirement becomes more than a sim-
ple procedural formality.40 The "giving reasons" requirement is one of 
the fundamental means through which a democracy controls the ac-
tions of its non-elected government actors.41 
The APA codifies the standard and scope of judicial review of agency 
action.42 A reviewing court has the power to decide all relevant ques-
tions oflaw, to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and to 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.43 When reviewing an agency action, the court shall: 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
M See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 180--84. 
35 See ill. at 188-89. 
56 See ill. at 192; AMAN, supra note 22, at 27. 
57 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 193-96. 
58 See ill. 
59 See ill. 
40 See ill. 
41 See ill. 
42 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pt. I, Ch. 7, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Scope of Review). 
45 [d. 
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(E) unsupported by substantial evidence ... on the record of 
an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are 
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.44 
219 
Under the APA, a court may hold an administrative act unlawful for 
any of the above reasons, as well as for lack of compliance with other 
provisions of the APA.45 Judicial authority to review the adequacy of 
administrative reasons places the court in the challenging position of 
second-guessing what is essentially a legislative or executive function.46 
The paradox inherent in this judicial role, given that the judiciary is 
arguably the least democratic branch and that it assumes the power to 
regulate the ''level of democracy" of the other governmental branches, 
is not new.47 The APA's standard of review establishes the courts' own 
level of transparency, theoretically limiting its ability to reverse admin-
istrative action.48 
II. "GIVING REASONS" IN THE U.S.-APPLICATIONS OF THE APA 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The APA requires agencies, when adopting rules, to provide a "con-
cise general statement of their basis and purpose."49 Even this minimal 
"giving reasons" requirement imposes a substantive duty on an admin-
istrative agency. 50 This is true even when an agency is acting within its 
44Id. 
45 Id. These other provisions include extensive procedural requirements for formal and infor-
mal rule making, notice requirements, and individual rights to appeal. See id. §§ 555-706. 
46 See William F. Funk, To Preserve Meaningful Judicial Review, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 174 
(1997). In fact, some U.S. scholars believe that courts and administrative agencies function as 
partners in the furtherance of the public interest. See id. That is, in "this collaborative enterprise, 
the courts are often asked to depart from the traditional modes of judicial decision-making and 
to assume an essentially legislative role." Id.Judiciai review in both the United States and Europe, 
is vested with: 
an essential and delicate mission: to decide political-issues in legal terms .... [The 
court] incurs the risk of displeasing both the executive and the legislature. In both 
systems, the Court is subject to the same criticism, sometimes for being too timid, 
sometimes, to the contrary, for being too "activist" or "daring." 
FAVOREAU, supra note 7, at 42. 
47 See id.; see also Burley, supra note 33, at 83. 
48 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 133. 
49Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
50 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 192-93. 
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own area of expertise and discretion.51 As stated by Chief Judge Bazelon 
in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus: 
Courts should require administrative officers to articulate the 
standards and principles that govern their discretionary deci-
sions in as much detail as possible .... When administrators 
provide a framework for principled decision-making, the re-
suIt will be to diminish the importance of judicial review by 
enhancing the integrity of the administrative process, and to 
improve the quality of judicial review in those cases where 
judicial review is sought.52 
The "concise, general statement of purpose and basis" requirement 
increases the accountability of administrative action by requiring agen-
cies, at a minimum, to act reasonably. 53 
Under the APA, when the court reviews an agency's interpretation 
of a statute committed to its administration, the court performs a 
two-step inquiry.54 The court first asks whether Congress spoke directly 
to the precise question at issue.55 If "the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."56 Judicial 
review ends and the action is not reversed if consistent with congres-
sional intent.57 If the statute is silent or ambiguous, however, the court 
reviews the agency's interpretation of its enabling legislation and de-
fers to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable and consistent with 
the statute's purpose.58 
51 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 22. 
52EnvironmentaI Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
Id. 
Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power to set aside agency 
action on the ground that an impermissible factor had entered into the decision, or a 
crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, that power has come into 
more frequent use, and with it, the requirement that administraton articulate the facton 
on which they base their decisions. 
55 See ill. at 598; see also Shapiro, suPra note 6, at 192-93; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 22. 
54Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
("court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpre-
tation made by the administrator of an agency"); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 439 F.2d at 
598. 
55 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
56Id. at 843. 
57Id. 
58Id. 
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The APA, therefore, requires that an administrative agency provide 
sufficient reasons for its interpretation of a statute so that a court may 
determine whether the agency's actions are reasonable.59 Recall, for 
example, the court's deference to agencies acting within the bounds 
of linguistic possibility, purpose and reason.60 Implicit in the court's 
analysis is the conclusion that an agency's interpretation of a statute is 
reversible if it is unreasonable.61 Judicial review of administrative action 
thus protects individuals from unreasonable state action, even in areas 
where administrative agencies enjoy a significant level of discretion.62 
In the case of administrative action based upon a record, the courts 
apply the "arbitrary and capricious" standard ofreview.63 Although this 
standard of review involves a close scrutiny of the record, courts are 
still highly deferential to the agency action, which is presumed to be 
valid.54 A rational basis for the agency's decision is once again the 
fundamental requirement imposed on the agency.65 
The aim of the judges is not to exercise expertise or decide 
technical questions, but simply to gain sufficient background 
orientation .... Our role is not as demanding when we are 
engaged in review of agency decisions, where we exercise 
restraint, and affirm even if we would have decided otherwise 
so long as the agency's decision-making is not irrational or 
discriminatory. The substantive review of administrative ac-
tion is modest, but it cannot be carried out in a vacuum of 
understanding. Better no judicial review at all than a charade 
that gives the imprimatur without the substance of judicial 
confirmation that the agency is not acting unreasonably.66 
59 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 22, 248; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 186-88; Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
60 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 22, 249-61 (discussion of statutory interpretation); Ethyl Corp. 
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("We do not weigh the 
evidence introduced before the Commission; we do not inquire into the wisdom of the regulations 
that the Commission promulgates, and we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which 
the Commission reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally supported"). 
61 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 187-88. 
62 See id.; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 61-62. 
63 See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 33-34; SCM Corp. v. United States, 487 F.Supp. 96, 99-100 (Cust. 
Ct. 1980). 
64 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); SCM Corp., 487 
F.Supp. at 232. 
65 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415; SCM Corp., 487 F.Supp. at 232; Shapiro, 
supra note 6, at 189 ("the ultimate test of a statute or other government action is reasonableness"). 
66 See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 69 (J. Leventhal, concurring). 
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In U.S. jurisprudence, therefore, the "giving reasons" standard is 
clearly a substantive requirement.67 Even under a deferential approach, 
the court requires administrative action to be reasonable.68 Adminis-
trative agencies are therefore held accountable to individuals through 
a legal system that has the power to reverse unreasonable state action.69 
III. ARTICLE 190 AND "GIVING REASONS" IN THE EU 
The EU is comprised of specific institutions that bring together the 
Member States in a variety of ways.70 The EU has both supranational 
bodies, that are above the control of national governments acting 
individually, and intergovernmental bodies, that are more accountable 
to their individual governments.71 The principal supranational institu-
tions of the EU follow a threefold separation of powers similar to that 
of the U.S. government: the executive European Commission ("Com-
mission"), the legislative-consultative European Parliament, and the 
judicial European Court of Justice.72 The European Council ("Coun-
cil") is composed of representatives from each of the member govern-
ments, and is one of the principal legislative bodies of the EU.7!! 
The Commission and Parliament, like their U.S. counterparts, have 
the authority to create and delegate powers to administrative agen-
cies.74 Unlike the U.S., however, the EU does not have a comprehensive 
system of codified administrative law.75 Although the EU treaties con-
67 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 187-88. 
68 See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 13 ('Without going so far as to hold that the Agency's construction 
of the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we conclude that it was at the very 
least sufficiently reasonable it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts."); Industrial 
Union Dept., AFL-CIO, v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 670 (1980) (concurring 
opinion) (''No rational system of regulation can permit its administrators to make policy judg-
ments without explaining how their decisions effectuate the purposes of the governing law, and 
nothing in the statute authorizes such laxity in these cases."). . 
69 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 239-44; Citizens to Preserve Overton Parle, 401 U.S. at 413-14; 
SCM Corp., 487 F.Supp. at 100; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706; but see Industrio.l 
Union Dept., AFlrCIO, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rhenquist, J., concurring) ("Under our jurisprudence, 
it is presumed that ilJ.i:onsidered or unwise legislation will be corrected through the democratic 
process; a court is not permitted to distort a statute's meaning in order to make it conform with 
the Justices' own views of sound social policy. "). 
70 See DAVID M. WOOD & BIROL A. YESILADA, THE EMERGING EUROPEAN UNION 2 (1996). 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 2-3. Although a proper comparison of the EU institutions to those of the U.S. is 
more complex, this analogy is appropriate for a basic understanding of the EU structure. See id. 
75 See Paul H. Vishny et aI., European Union Law: An Introduction, SB04 A.L.I.-A.BA. 1, 4-5 
(1996). 
74 See id. 
75 See SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 864. 
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tain various provisions regarding the procedure for promulgating di-
rectives and regulations, Article 190 is the only article stating some-
thing comparable to a standard of judicial review.76 Article 190 requires 
that "regulations, directives and decisions of the Council and of the 
Commission state the reasons on which they are based .... "77 
The EC], and more recently, the CFI, have developed the minimal 
"stating reasons" requirement of Article 190 into a substantive basis of 
judicial review. 78 The EC] could have followed the plain language of 
Article 190 which requires no more than a statement of reasons on 
which an agency action is based.79 Instead, the ECl has consistently 
held that in order to satisfY the Article 190 standard, "Community 
measures must include a statement of the facts and law which led the 
institution in question to adopt them, so as to make possible review by 
the Court and so that the Member States and the nationals concerned 
may have knowledge of the conditions under which the Community 
institutions have applied the treaty. "80 
In In re Generalised Tariff Preferences: EC Commission v. EC Counci~ 
the ECl's holding illustrates the substantive power of its Article 190 
interpretation.81 The case involved three regulations adopted by the 
Council regarding generalized tariff preferences for certain products 
originating in developing countries.82 Rather than specifYing a particu-
lar treaty article as the basis of its action, the Council adopted the 
regulations based on the European Economic Community ("EEC") 
Treaty generally.83 The Commission, on the other hand, had based its 
draft of the tariff regulations on Article 113.84 
The Commission brought suit against the Council seeking annul-
ment of the regulations.85 The Commission alleged that the Council 
acted unlawfully by not stating a specific article on which the regula-
76 See Burley, supra note 33, at 83-84; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 197-98; Treaty on European 
Union ("Maastricht Treaty"), Art. G, 31 I.L.M. 247 (Feb. 7, 1992). 
77 See Treaty of the European Economic Communities, Art. 190. 
78 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 210-17; Burley, supra note 33, at 83-84. 
79 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 210-17; Burley, supra note 33, at 83-84. 
80 Case 45/86, In re Generalised Tariff Preferences: Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493, 
[1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 131, '15 (1988). 
81 See id. " 5-6. 
82 See id." 1-4, 8--9. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. n 8--9. 
85 See In re Generalised Tariff Preferences, 1987 E.C.R. 1493 '11-2. 
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tions were based, therefore infringing the requirements of Article 190 
to state reasons.86 
The Council responded that it was not possible to speciry more 
precisely the legal basis for the contested regulations.87 The Council 
further stated that the basis of the regulations could be imputed from 
the regulations themselves, and that failing to state a specific treaty 
article was not an infringement of an essential procedural require-
ment.88 Moreover, the Council argued, stating reasons was a purely 
procedural requirement with no substantive effect.89 
The dispute whether the "stating reasons" requirement is merely 
procedural, or substantive, goes to the heart of Article 190 and the 
ECl's power of judicial review.90 If judicial review is limited to merely 
"giving reasons," as opposed to "giving good reasons," then the Coun-
cil's argument is persuasive.91 That is, if the purpose of Article 190 is 
solely to force an EU body to adopt boilerplate statements of reasons 
that merely recite the statutory language as a "whereas" and decisions 
as a "therefore," there would be no legal significance between passing 
the regulation based on a specific treaty article versus just the treaty 
generally.92 
The ECl, however, applied a more stringent standard of review, 
requiring "a statement of fact and law ... so as to make possible review 
by the Court.''!!3 Therefore, the ECj, like its U.S. counterpart, expressly 
requires bureaucrats to provide reasons in order to enable effective 
judicial review.94 Implicit in the ECl's holding is that incorrect reasons, 
the wrong legal basis, or insufficient facts would result in annulment 
of the adopted regulations.95 Thus, even in the absence of codified 
administrative law, the ECl, with its implicit powers of annulment, 
86 See id. 1 10. 
87 See id. n 10-14. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See In re Generalised Tariff Preferences, 1987 E.C.R. 1493" 20-22; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 
210-12. 
91 See In re Generalised Tariff Preferences, 1987 E.C.R. 1493'1 20-22; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 
210-12. 
92 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 210-12. 
93 See id. at 197-212; Lenaerts, supra note 8, at 122-24; In re Generalised Tariff Preferences: 
Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 14931 22 (council directive annulled by E.CJ. for failure to 
state legal basis as required by Article 190). 
94 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 210-17; Lenaerts, supra note 8, at 122-24. 
95 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 210-17. 
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applies a standard of judicial review that requires government action 
to be rational.96 
The standard of review applied in In re Generalised Tariff has ac-
quired more teeth over time.97 Thus, in United Kingdom v. EU Counci~ 
the Court reiterated that the choice of a legal basis for a measure must 
be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review.98 These 
factors include the aim and content of the measure.99 The ECj also 
held that judicial review of the exercise of institutional discretion is 
limited to whether the discretion has been vitiated by manifest error 
or misuse of powers. loo The duty to state reasons, however, does not 
require a specific statement of reasons for each technical choice made 
by an institution if the measure clearly discloses the essential objective 
pursued by the responsible institution.10l 
Although the standard for judicial review applied in these cases 
originated in actions between the Council and Commission, the same 
standards are applied to administrative agencies. 102 Thus, in an action 
by the World Wildlife Fund contesting the building of a visitors' center 
in an Irish national park using EU structural funds, the CFI explained 
the requirement to state reasons under Article 190 as follows: 
[I] t should be noted that the duty to give reasons for every 
decision has a twofold purpose, namely, on the one hand, to 
permit interested parties to know the justification for the 
measure in order to enable them to protect their rights; and, 
on the other, to enable the Community judicature to exercise 
its power to review the legality of the decision.10!! 
96 See id. 
97 See, e.g., Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council (Re Working Time Directive), 1996 All 
E.R. (E.C.) 877 (1996) 3 C.M.L.R. 671 (1996); Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council (Re 
Titanium Dioxide Directive), 1991 E.C.R. 1-2867, (1991) 3 C.M.L.R. 359 (1993); Case T-105/95, 
WWF UK v. European Commission, 1997 All E.R. (E.C.) 300 (1997). 
98 See Case 84/94, United Kingdom v. Council (Re Working Time Directive), 1996 All E.R. 
(E.C.) 877126. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 1 59 (judicial review of the exercise of ... discretion must ... be limited to 
examining whether it has been vitiated by manifest error or misuse of powers, or whether the 
institution concerned has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion."). 
101 See Case 84/94, United Kingdom v. Council (Re Working Time Directive), 1996 All E.R. 
(E.C.) 877 1 74 ("While the reasoning required by Article 190 ... must show clearly and 
unequivocally the reasoning of the ... authority which adopted the ... measure ... the authority 
is not required to go into every relevant point offact and law."); Case C-122/94, EC Commission 
v. Council, 1996 I.E.C.R. 881 1 29. 
102 See Case T-I05/95, WWF UK v. European Commission, All ER (EC) 300 (1997). 
10! ld. 166. 
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Furthermore, the duty to state reasons enshrined in Article 190 must 
be "disclosed in a clear and unequivocal fashion ... to make the 
persons concerned aware of the reasons and able to defend their 
rights, and ... to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdic-
tion."104 
In the absence of a codified system of administrative law, the EU 
courts have relied on various unwritten legal doctrines in order to 
develop a substantive standard of judicial review under Article 190.105 
The principle of proportionality, for example, requiring (1) that the 
means employed are suitable for achieving the desired objective, and 
(2) that the means do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objective, figures prominently in discussions of Article 190.106 Article 
190 serves as the treaty basis through which the ECJ accesses the 
doctrine of proportionality, thereby infusing the "giving reasons" re-
quirement with substantive review power. 107 The "giving reasons" re-
quirement, as applied to review of administrative action, has therefore 
developed into a significant standard of judicial review that, as in the 
U.S., protects individuals from unreasonable government action.IOB 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS- U.S. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA 
AND EU COURT REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 190 
A comparison of the language used by the U.S. courts and the EU 
courts suggests that both systems review administrative agency action 
in terms of a general standard of "reasonableness. "109 Both judicial 
systems require a minimum statement of reasons to enable effective 
judicial review. llo Moreover, neither system is satisfied with a merely 
procedural, rhetorical statement of reasons for agency actions. lll The 
duty to "give reasons," therefore, is a duty to "give the right reasons," 
i.e., reasons correct as a matter of law and right. ll2 The absence of a 
104 See Case T-19/95, Adia Interim SA v. EC Commission, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R 849 t 31 (1996). 
105 See SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 864. "However, where, as is the case in Community law, there 
is no detailed and comprehensive system of administrative law, and in the absence of clearly 
defined rules laying down fundamental rights, making the administration subject to the law and 
to judicial review can take place only by requiring a relationship to exist between the objective 
pursued and the methods used." ld. 
106 See id. at 865. 
107 See id.; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 217-18. 
lOB See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 217-18. 
109 See id. at 198-200. 
110 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 239-68; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 217-18. 
III See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 239-68; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 217-18. 
112 See STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 239-68; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 205-06. 
1999] STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 227 
codified standard of review has not deterred the EU courts from 
developing a standard of review substantially similar to that of the 
U.S.ll3 
For example, where a U.S. court states that effective judicial review 
requires a reasonable statement of the agency's legal basis ("principled 
reasons"), the ECJ implies the same when stating that Article 190 
requires reasons to be "disclosed in a clear and unequivocal fashion 
. . . to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. "114 
Similarly, where U.S. courts have the power under the APA to reverse 
administrative action if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," the EU courts rely on 
the principle of proportionality to hold that agency discretion is "viti-
ated by manifest error or misuse of powers, or whether the institution 
... has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion. "115 
Not hindered by the absence of a statutory system of administrative 
law, the ECJ is seeking the same democratic goal as its U.S. brethren: 
the desire for administrative accountability. I 16 The ECl's use of 'Judge-
made" law is also comparable to similar developments in the U.S.ll7 In 
the classic administrative law case, Goldberg v. Kelly, the U.S. Supreme 
Court created a new, legally recognized form of property. 118 By holding 
that a person's right to welfare benefits constituted property in the 
sense that termination of such benefits could violate the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court boldly went where 
the legislators had not gone before. ll9 Both the U.S. and EU courts, 
even in the absence of an express system of administrative law, rely on 
their judicial powers to apply the rule of law in such a manner as to 
protect individual rights from unreasonable administrative action.120 
I U See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 205-06. 
114 Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) with Case T-19/95, Adia Interim SA v. EC Commission, 19963 C.M.L.R. 8491 31 [1996]. 
115 Compare Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); SCM Corp. 
v. United States, 487 F.Supp. 96, 232 (Cust. Ct. 1980) with Case 84/94, United Kingdom v. EU 
Council (Re Working Time Directive), 1996 All E.R. (E.C.) 877. 
116 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 209-10; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 239-41; see also Burley, supra 
note 33, at 83-84; SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 5 (describing expansion of administrative law 
through judicial decisions). 
117 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 209-10; STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 239-41; see also Burley, supra 
note 33, at 83-84. 
118 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.8 (1970). 
119 See id. 
120 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 220; see also, LoRD MACKENZIE STUART, THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES AND THE RULE OF LAw (1977). 
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CONCLUSION 
Judicial review of government action is a fundamental principle of 
democracy.l21 Judicial review of administrative action, by requiring 
transparency in bureaucratic decision-making, is one method of regu-
lating non-elected government actors. 122 Unlike the U.S., which has a 
statutory scheme of administrative law, the EU relies on general legal 
principles to develop a standard of judicial review comparable to that 
applied by U.S. courts under the APA.123 
The EC], when it expanded the potentially simple procedural re-
quirement "to state reasons" enshrined in Article 190, developed a 
substantive standard of judicial review. 124 The ECl's expansion of the 
"stating reasons" verbiage into a duty to state the laws and facts on 
which the administrative agency relied in order to enable effective 
judicial review, created an implicit duty to state not just any reasons, 
but good reasons. 125 Thus, even in the absence of an explicit system of 
administrative law, the EC] has created its own substantive standard of 
judicial review of administrative action. 126 Both legal systems therefore 
seek to protect individual rights from unreasonable government action 
by imposing a duty to "give reasons" sufficient to enable effective 
judicial review, implicitly yielding the power to annul administrative 
action that is unreasonable, i.e., that is "arbitrary and capricious." 
Claudia Tobler 
121 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 179; SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 259-60 (discussing ECJ review 
of unlawful administrative conduct). 
122 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 217-20; SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 259-60; see also Burley, 
supra note 33, at 83-84. 
123 See SCHWARZE, supra note 3, at 259-60, 864. 
124 See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 210-11. "Where the government organ did give reasons but 
the ECJ says the reasons are not good enough, the court was often actually disagreeing with the 
government organ on the substance of the policy." [d. at 210. 
125 See id. at 209. 
126 See id. at 218-19; Burley, supra note 33, at 84. 
